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Topological Properties of Secure Wireless Sensor
Networks under the q-Composite Key
Predistribution Scheme with Unreliable Links
Jun Zhao, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Security is an important issue in wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs), which are often deployed in hostile environments.
The q-composite key predistribution scheme has been recognized
as a suitable approach to secure WSNs. Although the q-composite
scheme has received much attention in the literature, there is still
a lack of rigorous analysis for secure WSNs operating under the
q-composite scheme in consideration of the unreliability of links.
One main difficulty lies in analyzing the network topology whose
links are not independent. Wireless links can be unreliable in
practice due to the presence of physical barriers between sensors
or because of harsh environmental conditions severely impairing
communications. In this paper, we resolve the difficult challenge
and investigate topological properties related to node degree in
WSNs operating under the q-composite scheme with unreliable
communication links modeled as independent on/off channels.
Specifically, we derive the asymptotically exact probability for
the property of minimum degree being at least k, present the
asymptotic probability distribution for the minimum degree, and
demonstrate that the number of nodes with an arbitrary degree
is in distribution asymptotically equivalent to a Poisson random
variable. We further use the theoretical results to provide useful
design guidelines for secure WSNs. Experimental results also
confirm the validity of our analytical findings.
Index Terms—Security, key predistribution, wireless sensor
networks, random graphs, topological properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) enable a broad range of
applications including military surveillance, home automation,
and patient monitoring [1]. In many scenarios, since WSNs
are deployed in adversarial environments, security becomes
an important issue. To this end, key predistribution has been
recognized as a typical solution to secure WSNs [2]. The idea
is to randomly assign cryptographic keys to sensors before
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network deployment. Various key predistribution schemes have
been studied in the literature [1]–[13].
The q-composite key predistribution scheme proposed by
Chan et al. [1] as an extension of the Eschenauer-Gligor
scheme [2] (the q-composite scheme in the case of q = 1) has
received much interest [10]–[17] since its introduction. The
q-composite scheme when q ≥ 2 outperforms the Eschenauer-
Gligor scheme in terms of the strength against small-scale net-
work capture attacks while trading off increased vulnerability
in the face of large-scale attacks.
The q-composite scheme [1] works as follows. For a
WSN with n sensors, prior to deployment, each sensor is
independently assigned Kn different keys which are selected
uniformly at random from a pool of Pn keys, where Kn and
Pn are both functions of n, with Kn ≤ Pn. Then two sensors
establish a link in between after deployment if and only if they
share at least q keys and the physical link constraint between
them is satisfied. Examples of physical link constraints include
the reliability of the transmission channel [3], [5] and the
requirement that the distance between two sensors should be
close enough for communication [16].
Communication links between sensor nodes may not be
available due to the presence of physical barriers between
nodes or because of harsh environmental conditions severely
impairing transmission. To represent unreliable links, we use
the on/off channel model where each link is either on (i.e., ac-
tive) with probability pn or off (i.e., inactive) with probability
(1− pn), where pn is a function of n for generality.
In addition to link failure, sensor nodes are also prone to
failure in WSNs deployed in hostile environments. To ensure
reliability against the failure of sensors, we study the property
of minimum degree being at least k so that each sensor is
directly connected to at least k other sensors. This means that a
sensor may still be connected to a sufficient number of sensors
even if some neighbors fail. Note that the degree of a node v
is the number of nodes having links with v; and the minimum
(node) degree of a network is the least among the degrees
of all nodes. Another related graph property is k-connectivity,
which is stronger than the property of minimum degree being
at least k. A network (or a graph) is said to be k-connected
if it remains connected despite the deletion of any (k − 1)
nodes [18], [19]; a network is simply deemed connected if it
is 1-connected. Hence, k-connectivity provides a guarantee of
network reliability against the failure of (k − 1) sensors due
to adversarial attacks, battery depletion, harsh environmental
conditions, etc.
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In view of the above, we investigate topological properties
related to node degree in WSNs employing the q-composite
key predistribution scheme under the on/off channel model as
the physical link constraint comprising independent channels
which are either on or off. Specifically, we derive the asymptot-
ically exact probabilities for the property of minimum degree
being at least k, establish the asymptotic probability distri-
bution for the minimum degree, and show that the number of
nodes with an arbitrary degree is in distribution asymptotically
equivalent to a Poisson random variable. Our results are useful
for designing secure WSNs under link and node failure.
We summarize our contributions in the following two sub-
sections. We first present our results on node degree for a
secure WSN employing the q-composite key predistribution
scheme under the on/off channel model. Then we use the
results to provide useful design guidelines for secure WSNs.
A. Results
For Gq denoting a secure sensor network with the q-
composite key predistribution scheme under the on/off channel
model, we present several results related to node degree, by
considering the conditions on pe,q, which denotes the probabil-
ity of a secure link between two sensors. The secure link prob-
ability pe,q is given by pe,q = pn ·
[
1−∑q−1u=0 (Knu )(Pn−KnKn−u )(PnKn)
]
,
as shown in Equation (8) on Page 3 later.
For the network Gq, we now present the results, which are
further elaborated in Section III-A.
• First, we derive the asymptotically exact probabilities for the
property of minimum degree being at least k. Specifically,
if pe,q =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n for a constant integer k ≥ 1
and a sequence αn satisfying limn→∞ αn ∈ [−∞,∞], then
the probability that Gq has a minimum degree at least k
converges to e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)! , which equals (i) e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! if
limn→∞ αn = α
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), (ii) 1 if limn→∞ αn = ∞,
and (iii) 0 if limn→∞ αn = −∞.
• We extend the above result to provide the asymptotic prob-
ability distribution for the minimum degree. Specifically,
when αn above can be written as αn = b ln lnn + βn
for a constant integer b and a sequence βn satisfying
−1 < lim infn→∞ βnln lnn ≤ lim supn→∞ βnln lnn < 1 (i.e.,
c1 ln lnn ≤ βn ≤ c2 ln lnn for constants −1 < c1 ≤ c2 <
1), we have the following:
• if k + b ≥ 1 and limn→∞ βn ∈ [−∞,∞], then the
minimum degree of Gq in the asymptotic sense equals
(i) k + b with probability e−
e− limn→∞ βn
(k−1)! , (ii) k + b − 1
with probability 1− e−e
− limn→∞ βn
(k−1)! , and (iii) other values
with probability 0;
• if k + b ≤ 0, then the minimum degree of Gq in the
asymptotic sense equals 0 with probability 1.
• Our results on minimum degree are obtained by analyzing
the number of nodes with a fixed degree. Specifically,
we show that for a non-negative constant integer h, the
number of nodes in Gq with degree h is in distribution
asymptotically equivalent to a Poisson random variable with
mean n(h!)−1(npe,q)
he−npe,q .
B. Design guidelines for secure sensor networks
Based on the above results, for Gq denoting a secure
sensor network employing the q-composite key predistribution
scheme under the on/off channel model, we obtain several
guidelines below for choosing parameters to ensure that the
network Gq has certain minimum node degree. The guidelines
are given by enforcing conditions on pe,q , the probability
of a secure link between two sensors. Note that pe,q =
pn ·
[
1−∑q−1u=0 (Knu )(Pn−KnKn−u )(PnKn)
]
; see Equation (8) later.
For the network Gq , we now present the design guidelines,
which are further explained in Section III-B.
• First, to ensure that the network Gq has a minimum degree
no less than k (i.e., to ensure that each sensor is directly
connected to at least k other sensors), we can choose network
parameters to have
pe,q ≥ lnn+ (k + c1 − 1) ln lnn
n
for a constant c1 > 0,
(1)
where the positive constant c1 can be arbitrarily small.
• Second, to guarantee that the network Gq has a minimum
degree at least k with probability no less than ρ, we choose
parameters to have
pe,q ≥
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn− ln[(k − 1)! ln 1ρ ]
n
. (2)
• Third, to ensure that the network Gq has a minimum degree
being k exactly, we can choose network parameters to have
pe,q =
lnn+ (k + c2 − 1) ln lnn
n
for a constant 0 < c2 < 1,
(3)
where the positive constant c2 can be arbitrarily small.
C. Roadmap
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section II
describes the system model in detail. Afterwards, we elaborate
and discuss the results in Section III. In Section IV, we
prove Theorems 1 and 2 using Theorem 3. In Section V, we
detail the steps of establishing Theorem 3 through Lemma
1. Section VI provides the proof of Lemma 1 by the help
of Propositions 1 and 2, which are proved in Sections VII
and VIII, respectively. Subsequently, we present experiments
in Section IX to confirm our analytical results. Section X is
devoted to relevant results in the literature. Next, we conclude
the paper and identify future research directions in Section XI,
followed by the Appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our approach to the analysis is to explore the induced
random graph models of the WSNs. As will be clear soon,
the graph modeling a WSN under q-composite scheme and the
on/off channel model is an intersection of two graphs belong-
ing to different kinds, which renders the analysis challenging
due to the intertwining of the two distinct types of random
graphs [5], [20].
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We elaborate the graph modeling of a WSN with n sensors,
which employs the q-composite key predistribution scheme
and works under the on/off channel model. We consider a node
set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} to represent the n sensors (a sensor
is also referred to as a node). For each node vi ∈ V , the set
of its Kn different keys is denoted by Si, which is uniformly
distributed among all Kn-size subsets of a key pool of Pn
keys, and is referred to as the key ring of node vi.
The q-composite key predistribution scheme is modeled by
a graph denoted by Gq(n,Kn, Pn), which is defined on the
vertex set V such that any two different nodes vi and vj sharing
at least q keys (such event is denoted by Γij) have an edge in
between. With Sij := Si ∩ Sj , event Γij equals
[|Sij | ≥ q],
where |A| with A as a set means the cardinality of A.
As discussed, under the on/off channel model, each node-to-
node channel independently has probability pn of being on and
probability (1− pn) of being off, where pn is a function of n.
Denoting by Bij the event that the channel between distinct
nodes vi and vj is on, we have P [Cij ] = pn, where P[E ]
denotes the probability that event E happens, throughout the
paper. The on/off channel model is represented by an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graph G(n, pn) [21] defined on the node set V such
that vi and vj have an edge in between if event Cij happens.
Finally, we denote by Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) the underlying
graph of the n-node WSN operating under the q-composite key
predistribution scheme and the on/off channel model. We often
write Gq rather than Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) for notation brevity.
Graph Gq is defined on the node set V such that there exists
an edge between nodes vi and vj if events Γij and Cij happen
at the same time. We set event Eij := Γij∩Cij and also write
Eij as Evivj when necessary. It is clear that Gq can be seen
as the intersection of Gq(n,Kn, Pn) and G(n, pn), meaning
Gq = Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩G(n, pn). (4)
We define ps,q as the probability that two different nodes
share at least q keys and pe,q as the probability that two distinct
nodes have a link in between, where the subscripts “s” and “e”
are short for “secure” and “edge”, respectively. ps,q and pe,q
both rely on Kn, Pn and q, while pe,q also depends on pn.
Under Pn ≥ 2Kn, we determine ps,q through
ps,q = P[Γij ] =
Kn∑
u=q
P[|Si ∩ Sj | = u]
= 1−
q−1∑
u=0
P[|Si ∩ Sj | = u], (5)
where
P[|Si ∩ Sj | = u] =
(
Kn
u
)(
Pn−Kn
Kn−u
)
(
Pn
Kn
) , for u = 0, 1, . . . ,Kn,
(6)
since Si and Sj are independently and uniformly selected from
all Kn-size subsets of a key pool with size Pn. Then by the
independence of events Cij and Γij , we obtain
pe,q = P[Eij ] = P[Cij ] · P[Γij ] = pn · ps,q. (7)
Summarizing (5) (6) (7), we derive that under Pn ≥ 2Kn, the
link probability pe,q is given by
pe,q = pn ·
[
1−
q−1∑
u=0
(
Kn
u
)(
Pn−Kn
Kn−u
)
(
Pn
Kn
)
]
. (8)
III. THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We present and discuss the results in this section. Through-
out the paper, q is a positive integer and does not scale with n;
N0 stands for the set of all positive integers; R is the set of all
real numbers; e is the base of the natural logarithm function,
ln; and the floor function ⌊x⌋ is the largest integer not greater
than x. We consider e∞ =∞ and e−∞ = 0. The term “for all
n sufficiently large” means “for any n ≥ N , where N ∈ N0 is
selected appropriately”. As already mentioned, all asymptotic
statements are understood with n→∞, and we use the stan-
dard asymptotic notation o(·), O(·), ω(·),Ω(·),Θ(·),∼; see [3,
Page 2-Footnote 1]. In particular, for two positive sequences
fn and gn, fn ∼ gn signifies limn→∞ fngn = 1; namely, fn
and gn are asymptotically equivalent.
A. The Results of Graph Gq
We now present the results of graph Gq below.
Theorem 1 provides the probability of minimum degree
being at least k in Gq.
Theorem 1 (Minimum degree in graph Gq). For graph Gq
with Kn = ω(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), if there exist a constant in-
teger k ≥ 1 and a sequence αn satisfying lim
n→∞
αn ∈ [−∞,∞]
such that
pe,q =
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn+ αn
n
, (9)
then with δ denoting the minimum degree of Gq , we have
lim
n→∞
P [δ ≥ k]
=


e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! , if lim
n→∞
αn=α
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), (10a)
1, if lim
n→∞
αn=∞, (10b)
0, if lim
n→∞
αn=−∞. (10c)
Remark 1. The results (10a) (10b) (10c) can be compactly
summarized as limn→∞ P [δ ≥ k] = e−
e− limn→∞ αn
(k−1)! .
Interpreting Theorem 1. Theorem 1 for graph Gq presents
the asymptotically exact probability and a zero–one law for the
event that Gq has a minimum degree no less than k, where
a zero–one law means that the probability of a graph having
a certain property asymptotically converges to 0 under some
conditions and to 1 under some other conditions. To establish
Theorem 1, we explain the basic ideas in Section III-C, and
more technical details in Section IV.
While Theorem 1 above is for the property of minimum
degree being at least some value, we now present Theorem 2
below, which gives a more fine-grained result to provide the
asymptotic probability distribution for the minimum degree.
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Theorem 2 (Minimum degree in graph Gq: More fine–
grained results compared with Theorem 1). Under the
conditions of Theorem 1, if αn in Equation (9) can be written
as
αn = b ln lnn+ βn (11)
for a constant integer b and a sequence βn satisfying
−1 < lim inf
n→∞
βn
ln lnn
≤ lim sup
n→∞
βn
ln lnn
< 1, (12)
then with δ denoting the minimum degree of Gq, the properties
①–④ below follow:
① for k + b ≤ 0 (which implies b ≤ −k ≤ −1 given k ≥ 1),
we have {
lim
n→∞
P [δ = 0] = 1, (13a)
lim
n→∞
P [δ > 0] = 0; (13b)
and for k + b ≥ 1 (i.e., b ≥ 1−k), we obtain properties ②–⑤:
② lim
n→∞
P [(δ = k + b) or (δ = k + b− 1)] = 1;
③ if lim
n→∞
βn = β
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), then

lim
n→∞
P [δ = k + b] = e−
e−β
∗
(k+b−1)! , (14a)
lim
n→∞
P [δ = k + b− 1] = 1− e− e
−β∗
(k+b−1)! ; (14b)
④ if lim
n→∞
βn =∞, then{
lim
n→∞
P [δ = k + b] = 1, (15a)
lim
n→∞
P [δ 6= k + b] = 0; (15b)
⑤ if lim
n→∞
βn = −∞, then{
lim
n→∞
P [δ = k + b− 1] = 1, (16a)
lim
n→∞
P [δ 6= k + b− 1] = 0. (16b)
Remark 2. The above results ③–⑤ for k + b ≥ 1 and
limn→∞ βn ∈ [−∞,∞] can be compactly summarized as that
the minimum degree of Gq in the asymptotic sense equals (i)
k + b with probability e−
e− limn→∞ βn
(k−1)! , (ii) k + b − 1 with
probability 1 − e− e
− limn→∞ βn
(k−1)! , and (iii) other values with
probability 0, while results ① says that if k + b ≤ 0, then the
minimum degree of Gq in the asymptotic sense equals 0 with
probability 1.
Interpreting Theorem 2. Theorem 2 presents the asymp-
totic probability distribution for the minimum degree. We
explain that Theorem 2 is more fine-grained than Theorem 1.
We discuss first Theorem 2’s result ① and then its results ②–
⑤.
(i) In result ① above, b ≤ −k ≤ −1 follows from k + b ≤ 0
and k ≥ 1. Using b ≤ −1 and (12) in (11), we have
limn→∞ αn = −∞, so we use (10c) of Theorem 1 to
obtain δ < k almost surely (an event happens almost
surely if its probability converges 1 as n → ∞), where
δ denotes the minimum degree of Gq. For comparison,
(13a) of Theorem 2 presents the stronger result that δ = 0
almost surely.
(ii) In the above results ②–⑤ where k + b ≥ 1 holds (i.e.,
b ≥ 1− k) , we derive from (11) and (12) that
lim
n→∞
αn=


∞, if b≥1, (17a)
β∗, if b=0 and lim
n→∞
βn=β
∗∈(−∞,∞),(17b)
∞, if b=0 and lim
n→∞
βn=∞, (17c)
−∞, if b=0 and lim
n→∞
βn=−∞, (17d)
−∞, if b≤−1. (17e)
Below we discuss (17a)–(17e), respectively.
• For (17a) above, (10b) of Theorem 1 says δ ≥ k almost
surely, while ② of Theorem 2 presents the stronger result
that δ equals k+ b or k+ b− 1 almost surely (note b ≥ 1
in (17a)).
• For (17b) above, (10a) of Theorem 1 says δ ≥ k with
probability e−
e−β
∗
(k+b−1)! asymptotically, while ③ of Theo-
rem 2 presents the stronger result that δ equals k (note
b = 0 in (17b) here) with probability e−
e−β
∗
(k+b−1)! asymp-
totically, and equals k− 1 with probability 1− e− e
−β∗
(k+b−1)!
asymptotically (note b = 0 in (17b) here).
• For (17c) above, (10b) of Theorem 1 says δ ≥ k almost
surely, while ④ of Theorem 2 presents the stronger result
that δ = k almost surely (note b = 0 in (17c) here).
• For (17d) above, (10c) of Theorem 1 says δ < k almost
surely, while ⑤ of Theorem 2 presents the stronger result
that δ = k − 1 almost surely (note b = 0 in (17d) here).
• For (17e) above, (10c) of Theorem 1 says δ < k almost
surely, while ② of Theorem 2 presents the stronger result
that δ equals k+b or k+b−1 almost surely (note b ≤ −1
in (17e)).
Summarizing the above, compared with Theorem 1, Theo-
rem 2 presents a more fine-grained result for minimum degree
in Gq .
To prove Theorem 2, we provide the basic ideas in Section
III-C, and more technical details in Section IV.
Theorems 1 and 2 above are for the property of minimum
degree being at least k. We now consider a stronger graph/net-
work property, namely k-connectivity.
Extension to k-connectivity. We can extend Theo-
rem 1 to obtain the probability of k-connectivity in
Gq. Specifically, we can replace limn→∞ P [δ ≥ k] by
limn→∞ P [Gq is k-connected.], at the cost of replacingKn =
ω(1) and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) by a stronger condition set Kn
2
Pn
=
o
(
1
lnn
)
, KnPn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
and Kn = Ω(n
ǫ) for a positive
constant ǫ. Due to space limitation, we present the proof in
the full version [22].
B. Design guidelines for secure sensor networks
Based on the above results, now we provide several design
guidelines of secure sensor networks for achieving certain
strength of minimum degree.
• First, to ensure that Gq has a minimum degree no less than
k, we can choose network parameters to set
pe,q ≥ lnn+ (k + c1 − 1) ln lnn
n
for a constant c1 > 0,
(18)
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where the positive constant c1 can be arbitrarily small. To see
this, since (18) implies that αn defined by (9) (i.e., pe,q =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n ) satisfies limn→∞ αn =∞, we use The-
orem 1 to have P [Gq has a minimum degree at least k.] = 1.
• Second, to guarantee that Gq has a minimum degree at least
k with probability no less than ρ, we choose parameters to
ensure
pe,q ≥
lnn+ (k − 1) ln lnn− ln[(k − 1)! ln 1ρ ]
n
. (19)
To see this, since (19) implies that αn defined
by (9) (i.e., pe,q =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n ) satisfies
αn ≥ − ln[(k − 1)! ln 1ρ ], we use Theorem 1 to
obtain P [Gq has a minimum degree at least k.] ≥
e−
e
ln[(k−1)! ln 1
ρ
]
(k−1)! = ρ.
• Third, to ensure that Gq has a minimum degree being k
exactly, we can choose network parameters to have
pe,q =
lnn+ (k + c2 − 1) ln lnn
n
for a constant 0 < c2 < 1,
(20)
where the positive constant c2 can be arbitrarily small.
To see this, (20) implies that αn defined by (9)
(i.e., pe,q =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n ) equals c2 ln lnn,
so b in (11) is 0 with βn satisfying (11) and
limn→∞ βn = ∞. Then we use Theorem 1-Result ④
to obtain P [Minimum degree of Gq equals k exactly.] = 1.
C. Basic Ideas to Establish Theorems 1 and 2
We establish Theorems 1 and 2 for minimum degree in
graph Gq by analyzing the number of nodes with a fixed
degree, for which we present Theorem 3 below. The details
of using Theorem 3 to prove Theorems 1 and 2 are given in
Section IV.
Theorem 3 (Possion distribution for number of nodes with
a fixed degree in graph Gq). For graph Gq with Kn = ω(1)
and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), if
pe,q =
lnn±O(ln lnn)
n
(21)
(i.e.,
npe,q−lnn
ln lnn is bounded), then for a non-negative constant
integer h, the number of nodes in Gq with degree h is in
distribution asymptotically equivalent to a Poisson random
variable with mean λn,h := n(h!)
−1(npe,q)
he−npe,q ; i.e., as
n→∞,
P
[
The number of nodes in Gq
with degree h equals ℓ.
]/[
(ℓ!)−1λn,h
ℓe−λn,h
]
→ 1,
for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . (22)
Interpreting Theorem 3. Theorem 3 for graph Gq shows
that the number of nodes with a fixed degree follows a Poisson
distribution asymptotically.
D. The Practicality of the Theorem Conditions
We check the practicality of the conditions in Theorem 1:
Kn = ω(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1). The condition Kn = ω(1)
means that the key ring size Kn on a sensor grows with the
number n of sensors and thus it follows trivially in secure
wireless sensor networks [10], [23], [24]. For k-connectivity,
the condition on Kn (i.e., Kn = Ω(n
ǫ) is less appealing but
is not much a problem because ǫ can be arbitrarily small. In
addition, Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
= o(1) and KnPn = o
(
1
n lnn
)
hold in
practice since the key pool size Pn is expected to be several
orders of magnitude larger than the key ring size Kn (see [2,
Section 2.1] and [5, Section III-B]).
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2 USING THEOREM 3
As explained in Section III-C, we establish Theorems 1 and
2 based on Theorem 3. Theorems 1 and 2 present results
of δ, where δ denotes the minimum degree of Gq. With
Φn,h denoting the number of nodes with degree h in Gq,
Theorem 3 provides the asymptotic distribution of Φn,h. To
use Theorem 3 for proving Theorems 1 and 2, we now discuss
the relationship between δ and Φn,h. For non-negative integer
µ, it is straightforward to see properties ➊ and ➋ below.
➊ The event (δ ≥ µ) (i.e., the event that the minimum node
degree of graph Gq is at least µ) is equivalent to the
event
⋂µ−1
h=0(Φn,h = 0) (i.e., no node has degree falling
in {0, 1, . . . , µ− 1}).
➋ The event (δ ≤ µ) (i.e., the event that the minimum node
degree of graphGq is at most µ) and the event
⋃µ
h=0(Φn,h 6=
0) (i.e., there is at least one node with degree at most µ) are
equivalent.
Therefore, for any integer ξ, we obtain
P[δ ≥ ξ + 1]
= P
[ ξ⋂
h=0
(Φn,h = 0)
]
(by property ➊)
≤ P[Φn,ξ = 0], if ξ ≥ 0, (23)
P[δ ≤ ξ − 2]
≤ P
[ ξ−2⋃
h=0
(Φn,h 6= 0)
]
(by property ➋)
≤
ξ−2∑
h=0
P[Φn,h 6= 0] (by the union bound), if ξ ≥ 2, (24)
P[δ ≥ ξ]
= P
[ ξ−1⋂
h=0
(Φn,h = 0)
]
(by property ➊)
≤ P[Φn,ξ−1 = 0], if ξ ≥ 1, (25)
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and
P[δ ≥ ξ] = P
[ ξ−1⋂
h=0
(Φn,h = 0)
]
(by property ➊)
= 1− P
[ ξ−1⋃
h=0
(Φn,h 6= 0)
]
≥ 1−
ξ−1∑
h=0
P[Φn,h 6= 0] (by the union bound)
= P[Φn,k−1 = 0]− 1[k ≥ 2]×
k−2∑
h=0
P[Φn,h 6= 0],
(26)
where the indicator variable 1[k ≥ 2] equals 1 if k ≥ 2 and 0
if k < 2.
To use (23)–(26), we will compute P[Φn,h = 0] and
P[Φn,h 6= 0] for h = 0, 1, . . . To this end, we use Theorem
3, which shows that Φn,h is in distribution asymptotically
equivalent to a Poisson random variable with mean λn,h
specified by
λn,h := n(h!)
−1(npe,q)
he−npe,q ; (27)
i.e.,
P[Φn,h = ℓ] ∼ (ℓ!)−1λn,hℓe−λn,h . (28)
To assess λn,h in (27), we use (9) about pe,q (i.e., pe,q =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+αn
n ). While αn in Theorem 2 is given by (11)
and satisfies |αn| = O(ln lnn) = o(lnn) for a constant integer
b and a sequence βn under (12), αn in Theorem 1 may not
satisfy |αn| = o(lnn). However, we can still introduce the
additional condition |αn| = o(lnn) in proving Theorem 1, as
explained in Appendix E of the full version [22]. The idea
is to show that whenever Theorem 1 with |αn| = o(lnn)
holds, then Theorem 1 regardless of |αn| = o(lnn). Now
under |αn| = o(lnn) in Theorem 1, we obtain
pe,q ∼ lnn
n
, (29)
where fn ∼ gn for two positive sequences fn and gn means
limn→∞ fn/gn = 1; i.e., (29) means limn→∞ pe,q
/(
lnn
n
)
=
1.
Then we substitute (9) and (29) into (27) to derive
λn,h = n(h!)
−1(npe,q)
he−npe,q
∼ n(h!)−1(lnn)h × e− lnn−(k−1) ln lnn−αn
= (h!)−1(lnn)h+1−ke−αn . (30)
We now use Theorem 3 (i.e., (28)) to prove Theorem 1
under the additional condition |αn| = o(lnn), which we can
introduce based on the above discussion. Then we evaluate
P[δ ≥ k]. Given k ≥ 1, we know from (25) and (28) that
P[δ ≥ k] ≤ e−λn,k−1 × [1 + o(1)], (31)
and know from (26) and (28) that
P[δ ≥ k] ≥
e−λn,k−1×[1−o(1)]−1[k≥2]×
k−2∑
h=0
{(
1− e−λn,h)×[1+o(1)]}.
(32)
Based on (31) and (32), we discuss the following cases.
• If limn→∞ αn = α
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞), (30) implies for k ≥ 1
that
λn,h →


0, for h = 0, 1, . . . , k − 2, if k ≥ 2, (33a)
e−α
∗
(k − 1)! , for h = k − 1. (33b)
Applying (33b) to (31), and applying (33a) (33b) to (32),
we have e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! × [1 − o(1)] ≤ P[δ ≥ k] ≤ e− e
−α∗
(k−1)! ×
[1+o(1)] so that limn→∞ P[δ ≥ k] = e−
e−α
∗
(k−1)! ; i.e., (10a)
is proved.
• If limn→∞ αn =∞, then (30) implies for k ≥ 1 that
λn,h → 0 for h = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. (34)
Substituting (34) into (31), and substituting (34) into (32),
we obtain [1 − o(1)] ≤ P[δ ≥ k] ≤ [1 + o(1)] so that
limn→∞ P[δ ≥ k] = 1; i.e., (10b) is proved.
• If limn→∞ αn = −∞, then (30) implies for k ≥ 1 that
λn,k−1 →∞. (35)
Using (35 ) in (31), we have P[δ ≥ k] ≤ o(1) so that
limn→∞ P[δ ≥ k] = 0; i.e., (10c) is proved.
We now use Theorem 3 (i.e., (28)) to prove Theorem 2. The
condition (12) on βn implies that there are constants c1 and
c2 with −1 < c1 ≤ c2 < 1 such that
c1 ln lnn ≤ βn ≤ c2 ln lnn, for all n sufficiently large,
(36)
which implies
(lnn)−c2 ≤ e−βn ≤ (lnn)−c1 , for all n sufficiently large.
(37)
Using (11) in (9), we have pe,q =
lnn+(k+b−1) ln lnn+βn
n ,
which along with (36) implies pe,q ∼ lnnn . Then similar to
(30), we derive λn,h ∼ (h!)−1(lnn)h+1−(k+b)e−βn . Applying
(37) to this result and noting −1 < c1 ≤ c2 < 1, we find
λn,h


→ 0, for h = 0, 1, . . . , k + b− 2, if k + b ≥ 2;
∼ e−βn(k+b−1)! , for h = k + b− 1, if k + b ≥ 1;
→∞, for h = max{k + b, 0},max{k + b, 0}+ 1, . . . .
(38)
Using (38) in (28), we get
P[Φn,h = 0] ∼ e−λn,h

→ 1, for h = 0, 1, . . . , k + b− 2, if k + b ≥ 2; (39a)
∼ e− e
−βn
(k+b−1)! , for h = k + b− 1, if k + b ≥ 1; (39b)
→ 0, for h = max{k + b, 0},max{k + b, 0}+ 1, . . . (39c)
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If k+b ≤ 0, then (39c) gives P[Φn,0 = 0]→ 0, which along
with (25) and (26) yields P[δ ≥ 1] = P[Φn,0 = 0]→ 0 so that
we further obtain lim
n→∞
P [δ = 0] = 1 and lim
n→∞
P [δ > 0] = 0.
Hence, property ① of Theorem 2 is proved.
Below we consider the case of k+b ≥ 1 to prove properties
②–⑤ of Theorem 2.
Given k + b ≥ 1, we derive from (24) and (39a) that
P[δ ≤ k + b− 2]
{
≤∑k+b−2h=0 P[Φn,h 6= 0]→ 0, if k + b ≥ 2,
= 0, if k + b = 1,
which implies
P[δ ≤ k + b− 2] = o(1). (40)
Given k + b ≥ 1, we obtain from (23) and (39c) that
P[δ ≥ k + b+ 1] ≤ P[Φn,k+b = 0] = o(1). (41)
Given k + b ≥ 1, we show from (25) and (39b) that
P[δ ≥ k + b] ≤ P[Φn,k+b−1 = 0] ∼ e−
e−βn
(k+b−1)! , (42)
and show from (26) and (39a) that
P[δ ≥ k + b]
≥ P[Φn,k+b−1 = 0]− 1[k + b ≥ 2] ·
k+b−2∑
h=0
P[Φn,h 6= 0]
∼ e− e
−βn
(k+b−1)! . (43)
Then (42) and (43) together induce
P[δ ≥ k + b] ∼ e− e
−βn
(k+b−1)! . (44)
From (40) and (41), we have
P[(δ 6= k + b) ∩ (δ 6= k + b− 1)]
= P[δ ≥ k + b+ 1] + P[δ ≤ k + b− 2] = o(1); (45)
from (41) and (44), we obtain
P[δ = k + b] = P[δ ≥ k + b]− P[δ ≥ k + b+ 1]
∼ e− e
−βn
(k+b−1)!
→


e−
e−β
∗
(k+b−1)! , if limn→∞ βn = β
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞),
1, if limn→∞ βn =∞,
0, if limn→∞ βn = −∞;
(46)
and from (45) and (46), we conclude
P[δ = k + b− 1]
= 1− P[(δ 6= k + b) ∩ (δ 6= k + b− 1)]− P[δ = k + b]
→


1− e− e
−β∗
(k+b−1)! , if limn→∞ βn = β
∗ ∈ (−∞,∞),
0, if limn→∞ βn =∞,
1, if limn→∞ βn = −∞.
(47)
Properties ②–⑤ of Theorem 3 follow from (45)–(47).
To summarize, We have used Theorem 3 (proved in Section
V later) to establish Theorem 1 under the additional condition
|αn| = o(lnn), and to establish Theorem 2. In Appendix E
of the full version [22], we explain that whenever Theorem
1 with |αn| = o(lnn) holds, then Theorem 1 regardless of
|αn| = o(lnn). 
V. ESTABLISHING THEOREM 3
A. Method of Moments
For h = 0, 1, . . ., with Φn,h counting the number of nodes
with degree h in Gq , we will show that Φn,h asymptotically
follows a Poisson distribution with mean λn,h. This is done
by using the method of moments; specifically, in view of
[25, Theorem 2.13], we will obtain the desired result upon
establishing
P[Nodes v1, v2, . . . , vm have degree h] ∼ λn,hm/nm. (48)
Therefore, if Lemma 1 below holds, then the proof of
property (a) in Theorem 3 is completed; in particular, we will
have that for any integers h ≥ 0 and ℓ ≥ 0,
P[φh = ℓ] ∼ (ℓ!)−1λhℓe−λn,h . (49)
Lemma 1. Given (21) (i.e., pe,q =
lnn±O(ln lnn)
n ),Kn = ω(1)
and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), then for any integers m ≥ 1 and h ≥ 0, we
have
P[Nodes v1, v2, . . . , vm have degree h]
∼ (h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q ;
i.e., (48) follows with λn,h set by
λn,h = n(h!)
−1(npe,q)
he−npe,q . (50)
Section VI details the proof of Lemma 1. Given (21), we
obtain the following two results, which are frequently used in
the rest of the paper:
pe,q ∼ lnn
n
, (51)
and
pe,q ≤ 2 lnn
n
for all n sufficiently large. (52)
VI. THE PROOF OF LEMMA 1
To start with, we consider several notation that will be
used throughout. We recall that Cij is the event that the
communication channel between distinct nodes vi and vj is
on. Then we set 1[Cij ] as the indicator variable of event Cij
by
1[Cij ]:=
{
1, if the channel between vi and vj is on;
0, if the channel between vi and vj is off .
We denote by Cm a
(
m
2
)
-tuple consisting of all possible 1[Cij ]
with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m as follows:
Cm := (1[C12], , . . . ,1[C1m], 1[C23], , . . . ,1[C2m],
1[C34], . . . ,1[C3m], . . . , 1[C(m−1),m]).
Recalling Si as the key set on node vi, we define a m-tuple
Tm through
Tm := (S1, S2, . . . , Sm).
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Then we define Lm as
Lm := (Cm, Tm).
With Lm, we have the on/off states of all channels between
nodes v1, v2, . . . , vm and the key sets S1, S2, . . . , Sm on these
m nodes, so all edges between these nodes in graph Gq are
determined.
Let Cm,Tm and Lm be the sets of all possible Cm, Tm
and Lm, respectively. We define L(0)m such that
(Lm ∈ L(0)m )
is the event that there is no edge between any two of nodes
v1, v2, . . . , vm; i.e.,
L
(0)
m := {Lm | (|Si ∩ Sj | < q) or (1[Cij ] = 0),
∀i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m.}. (53)
We define Ni as the neighborhood set of node vi for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and define the node set Mj1j2...jm for all
j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1} by
Mj1j2...jm
:=
{
w
∣∣∣∣∣
w ∈ V \ {v1, v2, . . . , vm}; and
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
{
w ∈ Ni if ji = 1;
w /∈ Ni if ji = 0.
}
.
Clearly, the sets Mj1j2...jm for j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1} are
mutually disjoint. Setting Vm := {v1, v2, . . . , vm} and Vm :=
V \ Vm, we obtain ⋃
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}
|Mj1j2...jm | = Vm, (54)
and ⋃
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
|Mj1j2...jm | =
( m⋃
i=1
Ni
)
∩ Vm. (55)
We define 2m-tuple Mm through1
Mm :=
(|Mj1j2...jm | | j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1})
=
(|M0m |, |M0m−11|, |M0m−21,0|, |M0m−21,1|, . . . ).
Let E be the event that each of v1, v2, . . . , vm has a degree
of h. Given Lm ∈ Lm, we define Mm(Lm) as the set of Mm
under the condition that E occurs. Then it’s straightforward to
compute P[E ] via
P[E ] =
∑
L∗m∈Lm,
M∗m∈Mm(L
∗
m).
P
[(Lm = L∗m) ∩ (Mm =M∗m)]. (56)
Given that event E happens, if any two of nodes
v1, v2, . . . , vm do not have any common neighbor in Vm =
V \ {v1, v2, . . . , vm}, then Mm is determined and denoted by
M(0)m which satisfies

|M0i−1,1,0m−i | = h, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m;
|Mj1j2...jm | = 0, for
∑m
i=1 ji > 1;
|M0m | = n−m− hm.
1For a non-negative integer x, the term 0x is short for 00 . . . 0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
“x” number of “0”
.
By (56), we further write P[E ] as the sum of∑
L∗m∈Lm,
M∗m∈Mm(L
∗
m):
(L∗m /∈L
(0)
m )
or (M∗m 6=M
(0)
m )
P
[(Lm=L∗m) ∩ (Mm=M∗m)] (57)
and
P
[(Lm ∈ L(0)m ) ∩ (Mm =M(0)m )]. (58)
Consequently, Lemma 1 holds after we prove the following
Propositions 1 and 2. In the rest of the paper, we will often
use 1 + x ≤ ex for any x ∈ R and 1 − xy ≤ (1 − x)y ≤
1− xy + 12x2y2 for 0 ≤ x < 1 and y = 0, 1, 2, . . . (Fact 2 in
[3]).
Proposition 1. Given (21) (i.e., pe,q =
lnn±O(ln lnn)
n ), Kn =
ω(1) and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), we have
(57) = o
(
(h!)−m(npe,q)
hme−mnpe,q
)
.
Proposition 2. Given (21) (i.e., pe,q =
lnn±O(ln lnn)
n ), Kn =
ω(1) and Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), we have
(58) ∼ (h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q .
VII. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We embark on the evaluation of (57) by computing
P
[(Mm =M∗m) | Lm = L∗m]. (59)
With C∗m and T ∗m defined such that L∗m = (C∗m, T ∗m), event(Lm = L∗m) is the union of events (Cm = C∗m) and (Tm =
T ∗m
)
. Since (Cm = C∗m) and (Mm =M∗m) are independent,
we obtain
(59) = P
[(Mm =M∗m) | (Tm = T ∗m)].
For any j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1}, for any distinct nodes
w1 ∈ Vm and w2 ∈ Vm, events (w1 ∈Mj1j2...jm) and (w2 ∈
Mj1j2...jm) are not independent [8], but are conditionally in-
dependent given (Tm = T ∗m) (with the key sets S1, S2, . . . , Sm
specified as S∗1 , S
∗
2 , . . . , S
∗
m, respectively). Therefore,
(59) = f(n−m,M∗m)P[w ∈M∗0m |Tm = T ∗m]|M
∗
0m |×∏
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
P[w ∈M∗j1j2...jm |Tm = T ∗m]|M
∗
j1j2...jm
|,
(60)
where f
(∑ℓ
i=1 xi, (x1, x2, . . . , xℓ)
)
for integers ℓ ≥ 1 and
xi ≥ 0 with i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ is determined by
f
( ℓ∑
i=1
xi, (x1, x2, . . . , xℓ)
)
:=
(∑ℓ
i=1 xi
x1
)(∑ℓ
i=2 xi
x2
)
. . .
(∑ℓ
i=ℓ−1 xi
xℓ−1
)(
xℓ
xℓ
)
=
(∑ℓ
i=1 xi
)
!
x1!x2! . . . xℓ!
. (61)
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From (61) and ∑
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}
|M∗j1j2...jm | = n−m (62)
which holds by (54), we have
f(n−m,M∗m)
=
(
∑
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}
|M∗j1j2...jm |)!∏
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}
(|M∗j1j2...jm |!)
=
(n−m)!
/(
n−m−∑j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
|M∗j1j2...jm |
)
!∏
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
(|M∗j1j2...jm |!)
(63)
≤n
∑
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
|M∗j1j2...jm |
. (64)
Denoting
∑
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
|M∗j1j2...jm | by Λ, we prove Λ ≤
hm− 1 below if (L∗m /∈ L(0)m ) or (M∗m 6=M(0)m ).
On the one hand, assuming L∗m /∈ L(0)m , there exist i1 and i2
with 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ m such that nodes vi1 and vi2 are neigh-
bors with each other. Hence, {vi1 , vi2} ⊆ [(
⋃m
i=1Ni)
⋂Vm].
Then from (55),
Λ =
∣∣∣∣ m⋃
i=1
Ni
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣
( m⋃
i=1
Ni
)
∩ Vm
∣∣∣∣ ≤ hm− 2.
On the other hand, assuming M∗m 6= M(0)m , there exist i3
and i4 with 1 ≤ i3 < i4 ≤ m such that Ni3 ∩Ni4 6= ∅. Then
from (55),
Λ ≤
∣∣∣∣ m⋃
i=1
Ni
∣∣∣∣ ≤
( m∑
i=1
|Ni|
)
− |Ni3 ∩Ni4 | ≤ hm− 1.
To summarize, if
(L∗m /∈ L(0)m ) or (M∗m 6=M(0)m ), we have
Λ ≤ hm− 1, (65)
along with (62) leading to
|M∗0m | = n−m− Λ > n−m− hm. (66)
For any j1, j2, . . . , jm ∈ {0, 1} with
∑m
i=1 ji ≥ 1, there
exists t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} such that jt = 1, so
P
[
w ∈Mj1j2...jm | Tm = T ∗m
]
≤ P[Ewvt | Tm = T ∗m] = P[Ewvt ] = pe,q, (67)
where Ewvt is the event that there exists an edge between
nodes w and vt in graph Gq.
Substituting (64-67) into (60), we obtain that if(L∗m /∈ L(0)m ) or (M∗m 6=M(0)m ), then
(59) < (npe,q)
hm−1×P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm.
(68)
Applying (59) and (68) to (57),we get
(57) <
∑
L∗m∈Lm
{
|Mm(L∗m)|
× R.H.S. of (68)× P[Lm = L∗m]}. (69)
To bound |Mm(L∗m)|, note that Mm is a 2m-
tuple. Among the 2m elements of the tuple, each of
|Mj1j2...jm |
∣∣
j1,j2,...,jm∈{0,1}:∑m
i=1 ji≥1.
is at least 0 and at most h; and
the remaining element |M0m | can be determined by (62).
Then it’s straightforward that
|Mm(L∗m)| ≤ (h+ 1)2
m−1. (70)
Using (70) in (69), and considering
(Lm = L∗m) is the
union of independent events
(Tm = T ∗m) and (Cm= C∗m), and∑
C∗m∈Cm
P
[Cm= C∗m]=1, we derive
(57) < (h+ 1)2
m−1(npe,q)
hm−1×
∑
T ∗m∈Tm
{
P
[Tm = T ∗m]
× P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
}
. (71)
From (71) and limn→∞ npe,q = ∞ by (51), the proof of
Proposition 1 is completed once we show∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm = T ∗m]P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
≤ e−mnpe,q · [1 + o(1)]. (72)
A. Establishing (72)
From (103) and (105) (viz., Lemma 3 in the Appendix), it
holds that
P[w ∈M∗0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
= P[w ∈M∗0m | Tm = T ∗m]nP[w ∈M∗0m | Tm = T ∗m]−m−hm
≤ e−mnpe,q+(q+2)!(m2 )n(pe,q)
q+1
q +
npe,qpn
Kn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S
∗
ij|
× (1 −mpe,q)−m−hm, (73)
where S∗ij = S
∗
i ∩ S∗j . With (51) (i.e., pe,q ∼ lnnn ), we have
m2npe,q
2 = o(1) and mpe,q = o(1), which are substituted
into (73) to induce (72) once we prove∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm = T ∗m]e
npe,qpn
Kn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S
∗
ij| ≤ 1 + o(1). (74)
L.H.S. of (74) is denoted by Hn,m and evaluated below.
For each fixed and sufficiently large n, we consider: a)
pn < n
−δ(lnn)−1 and b) pn ≥ n−δ(lnn)−1, where δ is an
arbitrary constant with 0 < δ < 1.
a) pn < n
−δ(lnn)−1
From pn < n
−δ(lnn)−1, (52) (namely, pe,q ≤ 2 lnnn ) and|S∗ij | ≤ Kn for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m, it holds that
e
npe,qpn
Kn
∑m−1
i=1 |S
∗
im| < e2 lnn·n
−δ(lnn)−1·(m2 ) < em
2n−δ ,
which is substituted into Hn,m to bring about
Hn,m < e
m2n−δ
∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm = T ∗m] = em
2n−δ ,
b) pn ≥ n
−δ(lnn)−1
We relate Hn,m to Hn,m−1 and assess Hn,m iteratively.
First, with T ∗m = (S∗1 , S∗2 , . . . , S∗m), event (Tm = T ∗m) is
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the intersection of independent events: (Tm−1 = T ∗m−1) and
(Sm = S
∗
m). Then we have
Hn,m
=
∑
T ∗m−1∈Tm−1,
S∗m∈Sm
(
P[(Tm−1 = T ∗m−1) ∩ (Sm = S∗m)]×
e
npe,qpn
Kn
∑
1≤i<j≤m−1 |S
∗
ij |e
npe,qpn
Kn
∑m−1
i=1 |S
∗
im|
)
= Hn,m−1 ·
∑
S∗m∈Sm
P[Sm = S
∗
m]e
npe,qpn
Kn
∑m−1
i=1 |S
∗
im|. (75)
By
∑m−1
i=1 |S∗im|=
∑m−1
i=1 |S∗i ∩ S∗m|≤m
∣∣S∗m∩(⋃m−1i=1 S∗i )∣∣ and
(52) (i.e., pe,q ≤ 2 lnnn ), we get
e
npe,qpn
Kn
∑m−1
i=1 |S
∗
im| ≤ e 2mpn lnnKn |S∗m∩(
⋃m−1
i=1 S
∗
i )|,
further leading to
Hn,m/Hn,m−1
≤
Kn∑
u=0
P
[∣∣∣∣S∗m⋂
(m−1⋃
i=1
S∗i
)∣∣∣∣ = u
]
e
2umpn lnn
Kn . (76)
Denoting
∣∣⋃m−1
i=1 S
∗
i
∣∣ by v, then we obtain that for u ∈
[max{0,Kn + v − Pn},Kn],
P
[∣∣∣∣S∗m⋂
(m−1⋃
i=1
S∗i
)∣∣∣∣ = u
]
=
(
v
u
)(
Pn−v
Kn−u
)
(
Pn
Kn
) , (77)
which together with Kn ≤ v ≤ mKn yields
L.H.S. of (77)
≤ (mKn)
u
u!
· (Pn −Kn)
Kn−u
(Kn − u)! ·
Kn!
(Pn −Kn)Kn
≤ 1
u!
(
mKn
2
Pn −Kn
)u
. (78)
For u /∈ [max{0,Kn+ v−Pn},Kn], L.H.S. of (77) equals 0.
Then from (76) and (78),
R.H.S. of (76) ≤
Kn∑
u=0
1
u!
(
mKn
2
Pn −Kn · e
2mpn lnn
Kn
)u
≤ e mKn
2
Pn−Kn
·e
2mpn lnn
Kn
. (79)
By Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) and Lemma 2-Property (i),
Kn
2
Pn −Kn ≤
Kn
2
Pn
· [1 + o(1)] ≤ (q!ps,q) 1q · [1 + o(1)]. (80)
For n sufficiently large, from pn ≥ n−δ(lnn)−1 and (52) (i.e.,
pe,q = pnps,q ≤ 2 lnnn ), we have
ps,q = pn
−1pe,q ≤ pn−1 · 2n−1 lnn ≤ 2nδ−1(lnn)2. (81)
From (80) and (81),
Kn
2
Pn −Kn ≤ [q! · 2n
δ−1(lnn)2]
1
q · [1 + o(1)]
≤ 3q · n δ−1q (lnn) 2q . (82)
Given Kn = ω(1), for arbitrary constant c > q and for all
n sufficiently large, Knpn ≥
2cq·m
(c−q)(1−δ) holds. Then
e
2mpn lnn
Kn ≤ e (c−q)(1−δ)cq lnn = n (c−q)(1−δ)cq . (83)
The use of (79) (82) and (83) in (76) yields
Hn,m/Hn,m−1 ≤ R.H.S. of (76)
≤ e3qm·n
δ−1
q (lnn)
2
q ·n
(c−q)(1−δ)
cq ≤
(
e3q·n
δ−1
c (lnn)
2
q
)m
. (84)
To derive Hn,m iteratively based on (84), we compute Hn,2
below. By definition, setting m = 2 in L.H.S. of (74) and
considering the independence between events (S1 = S
∗
1 ) and
(S2 = S
∗
2 ), we gain
Hn,2 =
∑
S∗1∈Sm
P[S1 = S
∗
1 ]
∑
S∗2∈Sm
P[S2 = S
∗
2 ]e
npe,qpn
Kn
|S∗1∩S
∗
2 |.
(85)
Clearly,
∑
S∗2∈Sm
P[S2 = S
∗
2 ]e
npe,qpn
Kn
|S∗1∩S
∗
2 | equals R.H.S. of
(76) with m = 2. Then from (84) and (85),
Hn,2 ≤
∑
S∗1∈Sm
P[S1 = S
∗
1 ]e
6q·n
δ−1
c (lnn)
2
q
= e6q·n
δ−1
c (lnn)
2
q
.
(86)
Therefore, it holds via (84) and (86) that
Hn,m ≤
(
e3q·n
δ−1
c (lnn)
2
q
)m+(m−1)+...+3
· e6q·n
δ−1
c (lnn)
2
q
= e
3
2 q(m
2+m−2)n
δ−1
c (lnn)
2
q
.
Finally, summarizing cases a) and b), we report
Hn,m ≤ max
{
em
2n−δ , e
3
2 q(m
2+m−2)n
δ−1
c (lnn)
2
q
}
.
With n→∞, Hn,m ≤ 1 + o(1) (i.e., (74)) follows.
VIII. THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We define C(0)m and T(0)m by
C(0)m = ( 0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(m2 ) number of “0”
),
and
T
(0)
m = {Tm | |Si ∩ Sj | < q, ∀i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m.}.
Clearly,
(Cm = C(0)m ) or (Tm ∈ T(0)m ) each implies (Lm ∈
L
(0)
m
)
. Also,
(Cm = C(0)m ) and (Mm = M(0)m ) are inde-
pendent with each other. Therefore, with (58) = P
[(Lm ∈
L
(0)
m
) ∩ (Mm =M(0)m )], we get
(58) ≥ P[Cm = C(0)m ]P[Mm =M(0)m ], (87)
and
(58) ≥ P[Tm ∈T(0)m ]P[(Mm=M(0)m )|(Tm ∈ T(0)m )]. (88)
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Given
(Cm = C(0)m ) = ⋃1≤i<j≤m Cij and(Tm ∈ T(0)m ) = ⋃1≤i<j≤m Γij , applying the union bound, we
obtain
P
[Cm = C(0)m ] ≥ 1− ∑
1≤i<j≤m
P[Cij ] ≥ 1−m2pn/2, (89)
and
P
[Tm ∈ T(0)m ] ≥ 1− ∑
1≤i<j≤m
P[Γij ] ≥ 1−m2ps,q/2. (90)
In the following two subsections, we will prove
P
[Mm =M(0)m ] ∼ (h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q , (91)
and
P
[(Mm =M(0)m ) | (Tm ∈ T(0)m )]
≥ (h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q · [1− o(1)]. (92)
Substituting (89) and (91) into (87), and applying (90) and
(92) to (88), we have
(58)
(h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q
≥ (1−min{ps,q, pn} ·m2/2) · [1− o(1)]. (93)
From (91), we get
(58) ≤ P[Mm ∈ M(0)m ]
≤ (h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q · [1 + o(1)]. (94)
Combining (93) and (94), and using min{ps,q, pn} ≤√
ps,qpn =
√
pe,q ≤
√
2 lnn
n = o(1) which holds from
pe,q = ps,qpn and (52), Proposition 2 follows. Below we detail
the proofs of (91) and (92).
A. Establishing (91)
We have
P
[Mm =M(0)m ]∑
T ∗m∈Tm
{
P
[Tm = T ∗m]P[(Mm =M(0)m ) | (Tm = T ∗m)]},
where
P
[(Mm =M(0)m ) | (Tm = T ∗m)]
= f
(
n−m,M(0)m
)
P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
×
m∏
i=1
P[w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m]h, (95)
with function f specified in (61). From (63),
f
(
n−m,M(0)m
)
=
(n−m)!
(n−m−hm)!(h!)m∼(h!)
−mnhm. (96)
We will establish∑
T ∗m∈Tm
{
P[Tm=T ∗m]
m∏
i=1
{P[w∈M (0)0i−1,1,0m−i |Tm=T ∗m]h}}
≥ pe,qhm · [1 − o(1)]. (97)
We use (96) and (97) as well as (103) (viz., Lemma 3 in the
Appendix) in evaluating P
[Mm =M(0)m ] above. Then
P
[Mm =M(0)m ]
≥ (h!)−mnhm · [1− o(1)] · (1−mpe,q)n×∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm=T ∗m]
m∏
i=1
{
P[w∈M0i−1,1,0m−i |Tm=T ∗m]h
}
≥ (h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q · [1− o(1)]. (98)
Substituting (72) (96) above and (104) in Lemma 3 into the
computation of P
[Mm =M(0)m ] yields
P
[Mm =M(0)m ]
≤ (h!)−mnhmpe,qhm × [1 + o(1)]×∑
T ∗m∈Tm
P[Tm = T ∗m]P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
∼ (h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q . (99)
Then (91) follows from (98) and (99). Namely, (91) holds
upon the establishment of (97), which is proved below. First,
from (106) in Lemma 3, with T ∗m = (S∗1 , S∗2 , . . . , S∗m) and
S∗ij = S
∗
i ∩ S∗j , we get
m∏
i=1
P
[
w ∈M (0)0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m
]h
≥pe,qhm
m∏
i=1
[
1−
(
(q + 2)!m(pe,q)
1
q+
pn
Kn
∑
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}
|S∗ij |
)]h
≥pe,qhm
(
1− (q + 2)!hm2(pe,q) 1q − 2hpn
Kn
∑
1≤i<j≤m
|S∗ij |
)
.
With pe,q = o(1) by (51), we obtain (97) once proving
pn
Kn
∑
T ∗m∈Tm
(
P[Tm = T ∗m]
∑
1≤i<j≤m
|S∗ij |
)
= o(1). (100)
Clearly, |S∗ij | ≤ Kn. If T ∗m ∈ T(0)m , it further holds that |S∗ij | <
q. Consequently, from (90), Kn = ω(1) and pnps,q = pe,q ≤
2 lnn
n , the proof of (100) becomes evident by
L.H.S. of (100)
≤
(
m
2
)
pn · P[T ∗m ∈ Tm \ T(0)m ] +
q
Kn
· pn · P[T ∗m ∈ T(0)m ]
≤ m2/2 · pn ·m2ps,q/2 + q
Kn
≤ m4n−1 lnn/2 + o(1)
→ 0, as n→∞.
B. Establishing (92)
We have
P
[(Mm =M(0)m )∩(Tm ∈ T(0)m )]
=
∑
T ∗m∈T
(0)
m
{
P
[Tm = T ∗m]P[(Mm =M(0)m ) | (Tm = T ∗m)]},
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Figure 1: Initailzation at Epoch 0 Timeline
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Fig. 1. A plot of the probability that graph Gq(n,K,P, p) has a minimum
node degree at least k as a function of K for k = 4 and k = 8 with
n = 2, 000, q = 2, P = 10, 000, and p = 0.8.
where P
[(Mm = M(0)m ) | (Tm = T ∗m)] as given by (95)
equals
f
(
n−m,M(0)m
)
P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]n−m−hm
×
m∏
i=1
{
P[w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m]h
}
, (101)
with f
(
n−m,M(0)m
)
computed in (96). For T ∗m ∈ T(0)m , from
|S∗ij | < q and (106) in Lemma 3, we derive
P
[
w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m
]
≥ pe,q
[
1− (q + 2)!m(pe,q)
1
q − qpn
Kn
]
. (102)
Substituting (96) (102) above and (103) in Lemma 3 into
(101), and using pe,q = o(1) and Kn = ω(1), we conclude
that
P
[(Mm =M(0)m )∩(Tm ∈ T(0)m )]
≥ P[Tm ∈ T(0)m ] · (h!)−mnhm · [1− o(1)]
× (1 −mpe,q)n−m−hmpe,qhm
×
[
1− (q + 2)!m(pe,q)
1
q − qpn
Kn
]hm
∼ (h!)−m(npe,q)hme−mnpe,q .
IX. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To confirm the theoretical results, we now provide experi-
ments in the non-asymptotic regime; i.e., when parameter val-
ues are set according to real-world sensor network scenarios.
As we will see, the experimental observations are in agreement
with our theoretical findings.
In Figure 1, we depict the probability that graph
Gq(n,K, P, p) has a minimum node degree at least k from
both the simulation and the analysis, for k = 4, 8 and K
varying from 29 to 36 (we set n = 2, 000, q = 2 and P =
10, 000 and p = 0.8). On the one hand, for the experimental
curves in all figures, we generate 2, 000 independent samples
of Gq(n,K, P, p) given a parameter set and record the count
(out of a possible 2, 000) that the minimum degree of graph
Gq(n,K, P, p) is no less than k. Then the empirical probabili-
ties are obtained by dividing the counts by 2, 000. On the other
hand, we approximate the analytical curves of Figure 1 by the
asymptotic results as explained below. First, we compute the
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Fig. 2. A plot of the probability that graph Gq(n,K,P, p)’s minimum node
degree equals k exactly as a function of K for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 with
n = 3000, q = 2, P = 10000, and p = 0.5.
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Fig. 3. A plot of the probability distribution for the number of nodes with
degree h for h = 0, 1, 2 in graph Gq(n,K,P, p) with n = 3000, q = 2,
P = 10000, K = 35 and p = 0.5.
corresponding probability of pe,q in Gq(n,K, P, p) through
pe,q = p ·
∑K
u=q
[(
K
u
)(
P−K
K−u
)/(
P
K
)]
given (8) and P > 2K .
Then we determine α by (9) (we write αn as α here as n is
fixed); i.e., pe,q =
lnn+(k−1) ln lnn+α
n . Then given Remark 1
after Theorem 1, we plot the analytical curves by considering
that the minimum degree of Gq(n,K, P, p) is at least k with
probability e−
e−α
(k−1)! . The observation that the simulation and
the analytical curves in Figure 1 are close is in accordance
with Theorem 1.
In Figures 2 and 3, the curves with legends labelled “(E)”
are experimental curves produced from experiments, while
the curves with legends labelled “(A)” are analytical curves
generated from theoretical analysis. In Figure 2, we depict the
probability that graph Gq(n,K, P, p)’s minimum node degree
equals k exactly as a function of K for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
We set n = 3000, q = 2, and P = 10000, and p = 0.5.
For the experimental curves, we generate 2000 independent
samples of graph Gq(n,K, P, p) and record the count that
the minimum degree of graph Gq(n,K, P, p) is exactly k;
and the empirical probability of Gq(n,K, P, p) having a
minimum degree of k is derived by averaging over the 2000
experiments. The analytical curves are produced as follows.
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First, we compute the corresponding probability of pe,q in
Gq(n,K, P, p) through the aforementioned expression pe,q =
p · {1 −∑q−1u=0 [(Ku)(P−KK−u)/(PK)]}. Then we select ℓ∗ such
that
∣∣pe,q − lnn+(ℓ−1) ln lnnn ∣∣ is minimized for integer ℓ (i.e.,
ℓ∗ = argmininteger ℓ
∣∣pe,q− lnn+(ℓ−1) ln lnnn ∣∣) and further define
γ∗ such that pe,q =
lnn+(ℓ−1) ln lnn+γ∗
n . Given Remark 2 after
Theorem 2, we plot the analytical curves by considering that
i) if ℓ∗ > 0, then P [δ = k] equals e−
e−γ
∗
(ℓ∗−1)! for k = ℓ∗, equals
1 − e− e
−γ∗
(ℓ∗−1)! for k = ℓ∗ − 1, and equals 0 for k 6= ℓ∗ and
k 6= ℓ∗ − 1, and ii) if ℓ∗ ≤ 0, then P [δ = k] equals 1 for
k = 0, and equals 0 for k 6= 0. The observation that the curves
generated from the experimental and the analytical curves are
close to each other confirms the result on the distribution of
the minimum degree in Theorem 2.
In Figure 3, we plot the probability distribution for the
number of nodes with degree h in graph Gq(n,K, P, p) for
h = 0, 1, 2 from both the experiments and the analysis.
We set n = 3000, q = 2, K = 35, P = 10000, and
p = 0.5. On the one hand, for the experiments, we generate
2000 independent samples of Gq(n,K, P, p) and record the
count (out of a possible 2000) that the number of nodes with
degree h for each h equals a particular non-negative number
M . Then the empirical probabilities are obtained by dividing
the counts by 2000. On the other hand, we approximate the
analytical curves by the asymptotic results as explained below.
In Theorem 3, we establish that the number of nodes in
Gq(n,Kn, Pn, pn) with degree h approaches to a Poisson
distribution with mean λn,h = n(h!)
−1(npe,q)
he−npe,q as
n → ∞. We derive λn,h by computing the corresponding
probability of pe,q in Gq(n,K, P, p) through pe,q = p ·
{
1 −∑q−1
u=0
[(
K
u
)(
P−K
K−u
)/(
P
K
)]}
as explained above. Then for each
h, we plot a Poisson distribution with mean λn,h as the curve
corresponding to the analysis. In Figure 3, we observe that the
curves generated from the experiments and those obtained by
the analysis are close to each other, confirming the result on
asymptotic Poisson distribution in Theorem 3.
X. RELATED WORK
Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [21] propose the random graph model
G(n, pn) defined on a node set with size n such that an
edge between any two nodes exists with probability pn in-
dependently of all other edges. For graph G(n, pn), Erdo˝s and
Re´nyi [21] derive the asymptotically exact probabilities for
connectivity and the property that the minimum degree is at
least 1, by proving first that the number of isolated nodes
converges to a Poisson distribution as n → ∞. Later, they
extend the results to general k in [26], obtaining the asymptotic
Poisson distribution for the number of nodes with any degree
and the asymptotically exact probabilities for k-connectivity
and the event that the minimum degree is at least k, where k-
connectivity is defined as the property that the network remains
connected in spite of the removal of any (k − 1) nodes.
Recall that graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) models the topology of
the q-composite key predistribution scheme [27]–[29]. For
graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn), Bloznelis et al. [4] demonstrate that a
connected component with at at least a constant fraction of
n emerges asymptotically when probability pe,q exceeds 1/n.
Recently, still for Gq(n,Kn, Pn), Bloznelis [14] establishes
the asymptotic Poisson distribution for the number of nodes
with any degree. Our results in Theorem 3 by setting pn as 1
imply his result; in particular, the result that he obtains is a
special case of property (a) in our Theorem 3.
Yag˘an [5] presents zero-one laws in graph G1 (our graph Gq
in the case of q = 1) for connectivity and for the property that
the minimum degree is at least 1. Zhao et al. extend Yag˘an’s
results to general k forG1 in [3], [20]. Our results in this paper
apply to general q, yet the corresponding results for q = 1 are
already stronger than those in [3], [5], [20].
Krishnan et al. [16] and Krzywdzin´ski and Rybarczyk [7]
describe results for the probability of connectivity asymptoti-
cally converging to 1 in WSNs employing the q-composite key
predistribution scheme with q = 1 (i.e., the Eschenauer-Gligor
key predistribution scheme), not under the on/off channel
model but under the well-known disk model [7], [16], [30],
[31], where nodes are distributed over a bounded region of a
Euclidean plane, and two nodes have to be within a certain
distance for communication. Simulation results in our work [3]
indicate that for WSNs under the key predistribution scheme
with q = 1, when the on-off channel model is replaced by the
disk model, the performances for k-connectivity and for the
property that the minimum degree is at least k do not change
significantly.
XI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we analyze topological properties in WSNs
operating under the q-composite key predistribution scheme
with on/off channels. Experiments are shown to be in agree-
ment with our theoretical findings. A future research direction
is to consider communication models different from the on/off
channel model.
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APPENDIX
A. Additional Lemmas
Lemma 2. The following two properties hold, where ps,q
denotes the probability that two nodes in graph Gq share at
least q keys:
(i) If Kn = ω(1) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), then
ps,q =
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q × [1± o(1)]; i.e., ps,q ∼ 1q!(Kn2Pn )q .
(ii) If Kn = ω(lnn) and
Kn
2
Pn
= o
(
1
lnn
)
, then
ps,q =
1
q!
(
Kn
2
Pn
)q × [1± o( 1lnn)].
Lemma 3. In graph Gq, with pe,q denoting the probability
that two distinct nodes have a secure link in between, for any
T ∗m = (S∗1 , S∗2 , . . . , S∗m) ∈ Tm and any node w ∈ Vm, we
obtain
P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m] ≥ 1−mpe,q, (103)
and for any i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
P
[
w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m
] ≤ pe,q; (104)
and if Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), the following (105) and (106) hold:
P[w ∈M0m | Tm = T ∗m]
≤ e−mpe,q+(q+2)!(m2 )(pe,q)
q+1
q +
pe,qpn
Kn
∑
1≤i<j≤m |S
∗
ij|,
(105)
and for any i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
P
[
w ∈M0i−1,1,0m−i | Tm = T ∗m
]
≥ pe,q
[
1− (q+2)!m(pe,q)
1
q − pn
Kn
∑
j∈{1,2,...,m}\{i}
|S∗ij |
]
,
(106)
where S∗ij = S
∗
i ∩ S∗j .
Lemma 4. In graph Gq , if
Kn
2
Pn
= o(1), then for any three
distinct nodes vi, vj and vt and for any u = 0, 1, . . . ,Kn, we
obtain that with sufficiently large n,
P[(Γit ∩ Γjt | (|Sij | = u)] ≤ ps,qu
Kn
+ (q + 2)! · (ps,q)
q+1
q .
Due to space limitation, we provide the proofs of Lemmas
2, 3, 4 in Appendices B, C, D of the full version [22].
